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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
John A. Judd appeals from the order of the district court denying his 
request for post-conviction counsel and dismissing his petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court set forth the factual and procedural background of Judd's 
underlying criminal case and post-conviction proceeding as follows: 
John A. Judd ("the Petitioner" or "Mr. Judd") entered a guilty 
plea to one count of SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR CHILD 
UNDER SIXTEEN in violation of Idaho Code ("IC") § 18-6501(b). 
On September 28, 1998, Mr. Judd was sentenced by this Court to a 
fixed period of confinement of five (5) years and a subsequent 
indeterminate period of ten (10) years, for a total of fifteen (15) 
years. Thereafter, on April 20, 2000, the Petitioner filed a Motion 
for Correction or Reduction of Sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the 
Idaho Criminal Rules ("ICR"). On or about January 5, 2001, this 
Court denied that Rule 35 Motion as untimely. On March 20, 2007, 
the Petitioner filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Judd based that claim on the 
following grounds: 
(a) Counsel failed to advise the court that he was a 
minor at the time of the crime. Petitioner was 17 
years old. (b) Counsel failed to appeal the sentence 
witch [sic] was excessive and failed to file Rule #35 
[sic] upon petitioners [sic] request. (c) Counsel failed 
to advise the court of the conflict of interest. The 
petitioners [sic] father was sentenced by Judge in 
same type crime in 1985. 
On April 6, 2007, this Court issued an Order denying Mr. Judd's 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, dismissing the same with 
prejudice because the time for filing a Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief had expired. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a Notice of 
Appeal, and this Court then appointed the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office to represent Mr. Judd. On or about February 13, 
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2008, the Respondent, State of Idaho, filed a Motion for Remand, 
requesting "an order remanding this case to the district court and 
an order staying the briefing schedule until after the district court's 
final action on remand." Pursuant to that motion, the State argued 
that because this Court did not provide the Petitioner with twenty 
(20) days notice of its intent to dismiss as required by IC § 19-
4906(b ), this case should be remanded so that this Court could 
provide such notice. 
(Notice of Intent to Dismiss, filed 4/9/08, pp.1-2 (internal citations omitted, 
internal quotes verbatim).) 
The Idaho Supreme Court remanded Judd's post-conviction case to the 
district court, which issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and gave Judd twenty 
days to respond. (Notice of Intent to Dismiss, filed 4/9/08.) According to the 
district court, Judd thereafter filed an affidavit and motion for the appointment of 
counsel, and a response to the dismissal notice.1 (See Order, fifed 7/3/08, pp.1-
2.) On July 3, 2008, the district court filed an order in which it: (1) stated that 
Judd had filed an affidavit and motion "which this Court considered and herewith 
DENIES the appointment of counsel," and (2) dismissed Judd's post-conviction 
petition with prejudice because it was not filed timely and the court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider Judd's claims. (Id., p.2.) 
Judd appeals the denial of his motion for the appointment of counsel and 
dismissal of his post-conviction petition.2 
1 The response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss has not been 
made part of the record on appeal. 
2 Although Judd's most recent (i.e., after remand) notice of appeal has not been 
made a part of the record on appeal, such notice does not appear to have been 
necessary in light of the fact that the original appeal was remanded to the district 
court and the briefing schedule was stayed pending final action on remand. 
(Order Granting Motion for Remand and Motion to Stay Briefing Schedule, 
signed 3/19/08, filed with Idaho Supreme Court.) 
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ISSUE 
Judd states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it failed to rule on Mr. Judd's motion 
for appointment of counsel prior to dismissing his post-conviction 
petition? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Judd failed to meet his burden of establishing the district court abused its 




Judd Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing That The District Court 
Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Motion For Appointed Counsel 
Introduction 
In the same written order, the district court both denied Judd's request for 
the appointment of counsel and dismissed his post-conviction petition. (Order, 
filed 7/3/08.) On appeal, Judd contends the district court erred in denying his 
motion for appointed counsel in his post-conviction relief proceeding without first 
determining whether to appoint counsel to assist him. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-9.) 
There is no legal authority to support Judd's argument that the two rulings by the 
district court could not be presented in the same order.3 In any event, Judd's 
post-conviction petition was plainly untimely; thus, he failed to raise the possibility 
of a valid claim, and cannot show any harm in the denial of his motion for 
appointed counsel. Given Judd's failure to raise the possibility of a valid claim, 
he has failed to meet his burden of establishing that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying his request for counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to 
represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to J.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary. 
Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2007). "In 
reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction 
3 Judd does not assert that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
appoint counsel. Instead, Judd contends the timing of that ruling constituted 
error because it was not made prior to (vis-a-vis, in the same order as) the 
court's dismissal of his post-conviction petition. 
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proceedings, '[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this Court exercises free 
review."' Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,792,102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004) 
(quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001)). 
C. Applicable Legal Standards Under I.C. § 19-4904 
Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies 
financially and "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim that would 
require further investigation on the defendant's behalf." Swader v. State, 143 
Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 
P .3d at 1112. As Swader instructs: 
When considering a motion for appointment of counsel, the trial 
court must do more than determine whether the petition alleges a 
valid claim. The court must also consider whether circumstances 
prevent the petitioner from making a more thorough investigation 
into the facts. An indigent defendant who is incarcerated in the 
penitentiary would almost certainly be unable to conduct an 
investigation into facts not already contained in the court record. 
Likewise, a pro se petitioner may be unable to present sufficient 
facts showing that his or her counsel's performance was deficient or 
that such deficiency prejudiced the defense. That showing will 
often require the assistance of someone trained in the law. 
Therefore, the trial court should appoint counsel if the petition 
alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a 
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain 
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claim. The 
investigation by counsel may not produce evidence sufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss. But, the decision to appoint counsel 
and the decision on the merits of the petition if counsel is appointed 
are controlled by two different standards. 
143 Idaho at 654-55, 152 P.3d at 15-16 (emphasis added). 
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of 
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904, "permits the trial court to 
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determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of 
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the 
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be 
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. If, on the other hand, the claims are so 
patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that they could be developed 
into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel, the court may deny the 
motion for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless 
post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 
809 (2007); Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 
2004). 
D. Judd Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing The District Court 
Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Motion For Appointment Of Counsel 
In order to be eligible for appointment of counsel, Judd's petition had to 
present the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 
793, 102 P.3d at 1112. Judd failed to do so, as the district court explained in its 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss: 
As explained, a conviction was entered against Petitioner on 
September 28, 1998. He was allotted forty-two (42) days from that 
date in which to file an appeal. The Petitioner took no action until 
he filed his Rule 35 motion on April 20, 2000, nearly two full years 
after entry of his conviction. This Court denied that motion on 
January 5, 2001. His current Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
was not filed until March 20, 2007, well beyond the one-year period 
provided for the filing of such applications. Therefore, since Mr. 
Judd failed to file his Petition for Post Conviction Relief within the 
relevant time frame, that petition is barred. 
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(Notice of Intent to Dismiss, filed 4/9/08, p.5.) The district court's subsequent 
order of dismissal reaffirmed the futility of Judd's petition: 
On May 5, 2008, this Court signed an Order dismissing the 
Petition as Petitioner had not responded to the Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss. 
On May 8, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion to Extend Time 
frame which was granted by this Court and Petitioner was given 
until July 8, 2008, to respond. 
Petitioner thereafter filed an Affidavit and Motion for the 
appointment of counsel which this Court considered and herewith 
DENIES the appointment of counsel. 
Petitioner filed a response to Notice to Dismiss and this 
Court concludes it does not have jurisdiction to consider 
Defendant's allegations as his Petition was not filed timely. 
(Order, filed 7/3/08, pp.1-2 (emphasis added).) 
On appeal, Judd does not assert his post-conviction petition was filed 
timely. Rather, he argues that the district court erred by failing to rule on his 
motion for appointment of counsel prior to dismissing his post-conviction petition. 
In his appellate brief, Judd cites and relies upon part of a sentence in 
Charboneau, quoting, "[a]t a minimum, the trial court must carefully consider the 
request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the substantive merits of the 
petition." 4 Appellant's brief, p.7; cf. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 
1111. However, it is clear from the very language of the district court's order that 
it had already "considered" Judd's motion for counsel prior to dismissing Judd's 
petition. (Order, filed 7/3/08, p.2 (Judd filed affidavit and motion for "the 
4 The sentence quoted by Judd from Charboneau fully reads: "A court must 
carefully consider the request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the 
substantive merits of the petition and whether it contains new and admissible 
evidence." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111. 
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appointment of counsel which this Court considered and herewith DENIES .... " 
(emphasis added).) Judd's contention that the district court failed to consider his 
request for counsel prior to dismissing his petition is not supported out by the 
record. 
Nor has Judd presented any authority to support his contention that post-
conviction courts are precluded from making an express ruling in regard to a 
motion for appointment of counsel within the same written order that denies post-
conviction relief. Such a rule would be hyper-technicaI5 and would go much 
further than necessary to remedy the problem found in Charboneau -- where the 
district court had dismissed the post-conviction petition without making any ruling 
on Charboneau's motion for appointment of counsel. Charboneau, 140, Idaho at 
792,102 P.3d at 1111. 
Moreover, the dismissal of Judd's post-conviction petition was inevitable 
regardless of whether his motion for appointment of counsel was granted; thus, 
he cannot demonstrate any prejudice in the district court's ruling. In Swisher v. 
State, 129 Idaho 467, 470-471, 926 P.2d 1314, 1317-1318 (Ct. App. 1996), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals examined a similar situation as here, and ruled: 
It is thus apparent that Swisher's alleged claims for post-
conviction relief were time-barred more than a year before his 
application was filed. The action is therefore frivolous. Swisher's 
counsel on appeal has not identified any steps that could have 
been taken by an attorney, if counsel had been appointed to 
represent Swisher before the trial court, that might have prevented 
5 If the rule suggested by Judd were adopted, an order denying a request for the 
appointment of counsel would be proper if it was filed a day before an order to 
dismiss the post-conviction petition. In cases where, as here, the two rulings 
were contained in the same order, a reversal and remand to cure such alleged 
defect would merely result in a staggered filing of separate orders. 
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dismissal of this action. After having independently reviewed the 
record, we can perceive no substantial rights of Swisher that were 
or might have been impaired by the trial court's oversight in failing 
to make a timely ruling on Swisher's request for counsel. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's failure to consider 
Swisher's motion for appointed counsel before dismissing his action 
was harmless error. 
As was true in Swisher, there was nothing an attorney could have done in 
Judd's case to make his post-conviction petition timely, or to excuse its 
untimeliness. Judd attempted to excuse the late filing of his petition by asserting 
his three ineffective assistance of counsel claims were, in essence, based upon 
newly discovered evidence. (R., p.15 (alleging he learned of trial counsel's 
failures during a meeting with a local contract attorney in January of 2007, "and 
that is why the petitioner has waited as long as he has to file this motion").) A 
free review of Judd's petition shows he has not alleged facts that raise the 
possibility of a valid claim.6 In Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191, 30 P.3d 
967, 969 (2001 ), the Idaho Supreme Court made clear, "There is no discovery 
exception in I.C. § 19-4902, .... I.C. § 19-4902 expressly limits a party's time to 
bring a claim for post-conviction review to one year."7 In Schwartz v. State, 145 
6 Although the district court did not specifically address Judd's explanation for 
the untimely filing of his post-conviction claims, it implicitly rejected Judd's 
excuse. See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1986) 
(The implicit findings of the trial court should be overturned only if not supported 
by substantial evidence); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 
(Ct. App. 1998) ("[A]ny implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial 
evidence should be given due deference."). 
7 I.C. § 19-4209(a) states in relevant part: An application may be filed at any 
time within one ( 1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the 
determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following 
an appeal, whichever is later. 
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Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008), the court of appeals 
explained: 
The statute of limitation for post-conviction actions provides that an 
application for post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within 
one year from the expiration of the time for· appeal or from the 
determination of appeal or from the determination of a proceeding 
following an appeal, whichever is later. I.C. § 19-4902(a). The 
appeal referenced in that section means the appeal in the 
underlying criminal case. Freeman [v. State], 122 Idaho [627] at 
628, 836 P.2d [1088] at 1089 [(Ct. App. 1992)]. The failure to file a 
timely application is a basis for dismissal of the application. Sayas 
v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003). 
However, if an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has 
been concluded, an inmate may file a subsequent application 
outside of the one-year limitation period if "the court finds a ground 
for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or 
was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application." I.C. § 19-4908. See also Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). 
Consequently, and as the district court implicitly recognized, Judd's post-
conviction petition was untimely and appointed counsel could not have done 
anything to counter that fact. Because Judd's post-conviction claims are barred 
procedurally they are also frivolous, and Judd was not entitled to appointment of 
counsel to pursue those claims. See Swisher, 129 Idaho 467, 470, 926 P.2d 
1314, 1317 (Ct. App. 1996) (post-conviction petition procedurally barred, 
petitioner's action was frivolous, and any error in failing to appoint counsel was 
harmless). Judd has failed to demonstrate any error or possible prejudice in the 
district court's order denying his motion for the appointment of counsel and 
dismissing his post-conviction petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's order denying 
Judd's request for post-conviction counsel and dismissing his petition for post-
conviction be affirmed. 
DATED this 23rd day of December 2008. 
C. McKINNEY 
y Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of December 2008, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
HEATHER M. CARLSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
John . McKinney 
Dep y Attorney General 
JCM/pm 
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